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A B S T R A C T   
This paper examines the implications of imposing a climate tax on food consumption in Sweden combined with 
refunding of the tax revenues to farmers for selected agricultural activities enhancing ecosystem services: 
restoration of drained peatland (carbon sequestration), maintenance of grassland (biodiversity), and construction 
of wetlands (nutrient regulation). A partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector is used to assess eco-
nomic and environmental effects. The results show that the introduction of a climate tax corresponding to the 
existing Swedish CO2 tax of 115 euros per tonne carbon dioxide equivalent reduces total emissions from food 
consumption by 4.4% without any refunding of tax revenues. Refunding with payments for all ecosystems en-
hances the carbon sink by an amount equivalent to 57% of CO2e emissions from food consumption, and results in 
net benefits in the tax refund system for the agricultural sector as a whole, but is regressive where farmers in 
regions with relatively high incomes receive proportionally much of the net benefits.   
1. Introduction 
Estimated emissions of carbon dioxide equivalents, CO2eq, from 
current food system range between 19% and 29% worldwide (Ver-
muelen et al., 2012). Most of the emissions originate from animal 
products, which can correspond to 18% of global anthropogenic CO2eq 
emissions (e.g, McMichael et al., 2007; Gerber et al., 2013; Clune et al., 
2017). Suggestions have therefore been made to introduce climate taxes 
on meat consumption in order to reduce demand and emissions (e.g. 
Nellman et al., 2009; Cederberg et al., 2013; Bajzĕlj et al., 2014; Säll and 
Gren, 2015). Arguments for a tax on consumption instead of firms’ 
pollutants, which would be the first best according to economic theory, 
are the concern for the competitiveness of the sectors paying the tax and 
the risk of carbon leakage (e.g. Van Doorslaer et al., 2015). However, 
several studies have shown that the price elasticity of demand for meat 
and dairy products with relatively large CO2eq emissions is low (e.g. 
Wirsenius et al., 2011; Edjabou and Smed, 2013; Säll and Gren, 2015; 
Chalmers et al., 2016; Jansson and Säll, 2018). Considerable increases in 
the price of meat are then required if a significant reduction in emissions 
is to be achieved. Such a tax will create negative welfare effects for 
consumers, the magnitude of which depends on responses to the tax and 
consumption shares of CO2eq intensive food products (e.g. Säll, 2018). 
The negative effects on consumers and eventual regressive income 
distributional effects (i.e. proportionally large welfare decreases from 
the tax for low income households) are likely to influence the con-
sumers’ acceptance of a climate tax and thereby the introduction of this 
policy as a means of reducing CO2eq emissions (e.g. Kallbecken and 
Saelen, 2011). This might add to the existing public resistance towards 
environmental taxes in general (e.g. Bachus et al., 2019). Another group 
in society, the producers of agricultural outputs, will also face negative 
effects of the tax through decreases and reallocation of demand for 
different food products. A common result in the large literature in po-
litical economy of environmental regulations, which can be traced to 
Buchanan and Tullock (1975), is that firms meeting higher costs due to 
an environmental tax form powerful groups and lobby against its 
introduction, which the authorities have difficulties to resist (e.g. 
Damania et al., 2003; Cai and Li, 2020). An exception to this rule is that 
firms obtaining competitive or other advantages can lobby in favour of 
environmental regulations (e.g. Grey, 2018; Cai and Li, 2020). 
However, Grimsrud et al. (2019) showed in a study of consumers in 
Norway that consumers’ acceptance of a tax on red meet and their 
willingness to pay the tax increases when the tax revenues are refunded 
and earmarked for development of environmentally friendly technolo-
gies. A combined tax and refunding scheme where firms paying the tax 
are compensated for the increased cost is also likely to increase the 
acceptance among firms (e.g. Fredriksson and Sterner, 2005; Sterner and 
Höglund-Isaksson, 2006; Aidt, 2010). Such tax-refunding schemes have 
been introduced in several countries, such as the air pollution charges in 
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Sweden, France, Norway, and the USA, and water and road charges in e. 
g., China and Columbia which are tied with abatement requirements 
(Wheeler et al., 2000; Millock et al., 2004; Hagem et al., 2020). 
A climate tax on food consumption combined with earmarked 
refunding of tax revenues to environmentally friendly technologies in 
agriculture may thus promote acceptance among both consumers and 
producers and improve the political feasibility of the tax. However, 
acceptance among the farmers might be reduced if it turns out that the 
tax-refund system is regressive where the costs of the system is high for 
the less wealthy farmers (e.g. Kallebekken and Saelen, 2011; Bachus 
et al., 2019). Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to calculate 
effects on CO2eq emissions, farmers’ net income and distribution of costs 
of a tax-refunding scheme in Sweden. To this end, a partial equilibrium 
model of the agricultural sector CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy 
Regionalized Impact) is used, which simulates consumers’ and farmers’ 
simultaneous responses to the tax and the refunding scheme. The CAPRI 
model was chosen because it is freely available, with a detailed repre-
sentation of production and demand for agricultural commodities in 
Sweden, as well as in the rest of the EU. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no empirical study on 
the effects of an environmental tax on food consumption combined with 
refunding of tax revenues to farmers. Several studies have examined the 
effects of an environmental tax on producers, which is refunded to the 
same group of producers in different ways. Most of this literature is 
theoretical and examines impacts of earmarking the revenues from the 
taxes to support firms based on their outputs or pollutant abatement cost 
(e.g. Gersbach and Requate, 2004; Bernard et al., 2007; Aidt, 2010; 
Fischer, 2011; Hagem et al., 2020). There are few empirical studies on 
environmental taxes with earmarked refunding of the tax revenues 
(Millock and Nauges, 2006; Sterner and Höglund-Isaksson, 2006; 
Bonilla et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2018). Millock and Nauge (2006) 
found in an ex-post evaluation of the French system with taxes on air 
pollution that the subsidy on abatement increased overall emissions 
through the lowering of abatement cost. Results from evaluations of the 
Swedish refundable tax on nitrogen oxides by Sterner and Höglund- 
Isaksson (2006) and Bonilla et al. (2015) showed that the refunding 
boosted investment in the abatement of nitrogen oxides. Brown et al. 
(2018) examined the potential of a CO2 tax combined with an output 
subsidy when the market for electricity in Alberta, Canada is imperfect. 
Their results showed that subsidies differentiated with respect to emis-
sion intensity can have a relatively high impact on reducing the emis-
sions in the sector. 
In our view, the main contribution of this study is the empirical 
analyses of effects on CO2eq emissions and farmers’ incomes of a climate 
tax on food consumption combined with refunding to promote envi-
ronmental and climate friendly agricultural production in Sweden. One 
key finding is that a climate tax on food consumption has a minor effect 
on CO2eq emissions, but a refunding of the tax revenues for restoring 
drained peatlands can reduce emissions considerably and raise income 
for the farmers. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In 
Section 2 we define the design of the tax and refunding scheme, the 
Swedish policy context in which it is introduced, and policy scenarios. 
The partial equilibrium model CAPRI is described in the next section, 
and results are presented in Section 4. The paper ends with a discussion 
of the results, policy implications and conclusions. 
2. Policy design, context and scenarios 
In the present study, the climate tax on each commodity is based on 
the CO2eq emissions embodied in it, which is assumed to reflect the cost 
of carbon generated by a marginal increase in a food good (e.g. Gren 
et al., 2019). In a similar vein, payments for ecosystem services are 
determined by the unit value of the service and the supply. This tax 
refund system is introduced in a landscape of existing policies for the 
agricultural sector in Sweden. 
2.1. Calculation of the climate tax and payments for ecosystem services 
The tax consists of two parts: CO2eq emission by the food good and 
the marginal social cost of CO2eq emissions. Regarding calculations of 
CO2eq emissions, we only considered emissions from production of the 
food commodity, which, in line with the UNFCCC guidelines, includes 
emissions of methane and nitrous oxides from agricultural processes (e. 
g. Gren et al., 2019). This excludes, for example, CO2 from fossil fuels in 
energy production and transport, and emissions associated with the 
industrial production of inputs. Many of these emissions are taxed in 
Sweden, and their inclusion in emissions from food, which is common in 
several studies estimating impacts of a climate tax on food, would imply 
double taxation. The choice of food commodities and data on emission 
coefficients is based on the partial equilibrium model CAPRI, presented 
in Section 3, which includes 33 food items and the emission coefficients 
range between zero (certain fruits) and 17.97 (sheep and goat meat) kg 
CO2eq/kg food (Table S1 in Supplementary material). Because of lack of 
data, the calculated coefficients, which are based on food production in 
Sweden, are the same for the Swedish and imported food products. This 
is a simplification since they would differ for different origins of 
production. 
There is a large body of literature estimating the damage costs of 
marginal CO2eq emissions (see van den Bijgaart et al., 2016 for a re-
view). In principle, there are four different approaches. One is to 
calculate the shadow cost of reaching CO2eq targets in a cost- 
effectiveness framework (see Tol, 2013 for a review), another is to 
calculate damages in monetary terms from a marginal change in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (e.g. Tol, 2005; Marten et al., 2015). A 
third alternative is to calculate optimal marginal damage when 
considering costs of mitigation measures (e.g. Nordhaus, 2007; Hassler 
et al., 2016). The fourth approach, which was used in this study, is to 
perceive existing carbon taxes as a revealed preference of the marginal 
damage. Another argument for using the existing carbon tax in Sweden 
is that all sources of CO2eq should have the same tax level for cost- 
effective CO2eq emission reductions. The Swedish tax is applied on 
emissions from all sectors with tax exempts for firms participating in the 
EU emission trading system (see Ministry of Finance (2020) for a 
description). The tax amounted to approximately 115 euros/tonne 
CO2eq at 2019 prices (e.g. Martinsson and Fridahl, 2018). The intro-
duction of this tax generates price increases for the included products, 
varying between zero for certain fruits without emissions and 2 euro/kg 
for beef, sheep and goat meat (Table S1 in Supplementary material). 
With respect to which environmental improvements to subsidize, 
measures combatting climate change are obvious candidates. In prac-
tice, revenues from carbon taxes are refunded for such measures in many 
countries (Carl and Fedor, 2016). This study will consider one such 
measure, restoration of drained peatland, which has been shown to have 
a high potential in reducing leaching of CO2eq from soils (e.g. Pahka-
kangas et al., 2016). It is well-known that the agricultural sector is a 
source of water pollution and biodiversity degradation, and we therefore 
include measures improving water quality and biodiversity. The pay-
ment for biodiversity may mitigate eventual negative effects of the 
climate tax on grazing animals needed for preserving biodiversity on 
grasslands. In principle, the payment per unit of ecosystem service 
should correspond to the marginal value of the service, such as the value 
of a marginal unit of biodiversity. 
Ideally, there are (i) quantified functional relationships between land 
use and the provision of an ecosystem service, and (ii) data on the value 
per unit of the ecosystem services. Sweden is an elongated land, and the 
provision of the ecosystem services differs among regions, which is also 
the case for other land uses. The payment and adjustment by the farmers 
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will then differ depending on the productivity of land. Therefore, the 
country is divided into eight different NUTS21 regions, which differ with 
respect to climate and soil conditions. For each of these regions, quan-
tities and unit values are calculated for three types of services: carbon 
sequestration from restoration of drained peatland, nutrient regulation 
from the construction of wetlands, and biodiversity by natural 
grassland. 
According to the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2014), the gross 
leaching of CO2eq from agriculture on drained peatland amounts to 30.3 
tonnes CO2eq/ha and year for arable land and 11.4 tonnes CO2eq/ha for 
grassland. However, the restoration of peatlands would not eliminate all 
leaching because of the methane release, which amounts to 4.4 and 0.3 
tonnes CO2eq/ha on arable land and grassland respectively, resulting in 
reduced leaching of 25.9 and 11.1 tonnes CO2eq/ha on arable land and 
grassland respectively. The value per unit leaching reduction was 
assumed to correspond to the actual Swedish tax of 115 euros/tonne 
CO2eq, which gives a payment of 2,978 euros/ha and 1,277 euros/ha for 
peatland restoration on arable land and grassland, respectively. 
Payments for the construction of wetlands to regulate nutrient loads 
are calculated as the quantity of nutrient retention in the wetlands 
multiplied by the unit value of each nutrient reduction. Nutrient loads 
from emission sources and nutrient retention vary between the regions. 
There is only one study calculating nutrient abatement by wetland, 
which accounts for management practices at emission sources and 
nutrient retention (Gren and Säll, 2015), and which is used in the pre-
sent study (Table S3 in Supplementary material). The unit value of 
nutrient abatement was obtained from Gren et al. (2018) and is calcu-
lated as the shadow cost of achieving the nutrient emissions targets set 
by the international agreement in the Baltic Sea Action Plan (Helcom, 
2013), which envisages reductions by 13% and 42% in the total loads of 
nitrogen and phosphorus, respectively. The shadow costs in a cost- 
effective solution amount to 4 euros/kg nitrogen (N) and 362 euros/ 
kg phosphorus (P) at 2019 prices, which show the increases in minimum 
costs of reducing the emission target by 1 kg of the respective nutrient. 
Using these values and the wetland abatement reported in Table S3, the 
payment for nutrient regulation per ha wetland construction varies be-
tween 414 euros/ha and 2,879 euros/ha (Table S2). 
Regarding payments for biodiversity provision by natural grassland, 
there is a large body of literature on the estimation of the value of 
biodiversity provided by different ecosystems in different parts of the 
world (see Atkinson et al., 2012 for a review). Most studies estimate the 
value by stated preferences in hypothetical markets where they provide 
a willingness to pay or willingness to accept a certain change in the 
provision of biodiversity. In principle, we could have transferred the 
estimated measure of value per ha from these studies, but there has been 
no study of the biodiversity value of grassland in the boreal zones. As 
with the choice of social cost of carbon, we therefore applied the 
revealed preference approach where the actual payments for biodiver-
sity on grassland in the NUTS2 regions are assumed to reflect the au-
thorities’ perceived values. However, actual payments are limited by 
budget constraints, and it was simply assumed here that the actual 
valuation is twice as high as the actual payments. In Section 5, sensi-
tivity analysis is made with respect to the level of this and the payments 
for peatlands and wetlands. As shown in Table S2, these payments vary 
between 169 euros/ha (Sydsverige) and 521 euros/ha (Övre Norrland). 
2.2. Policy context and scenarios 
The suggested tax-refund system is not implemented in a policy 
vacuum. On the contrary, Sweden is, as a member of the EU, subject to 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the overall purpose of which is to 
ensure viable food production, sustainable use of natural resources and 
balanced development among the countries in the rural areas (European 
Commission, 2020). The CAP regulations are divided into two main 
classes, Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. Pillar 1 accounts for approximately 75% of 
the total CAP budget with direct payments to the farmers, which are 
based on the number of hectares farmed. In order to receive the basic 
payment, the farmers have to comply with cross-compliance conditions 
which involve protection of water quality and quantity, soil and carbon 
stock, and landscape features. In addition, the greening payments are 
directed towards maintaining permanent grassland, crop diversification, 
and ecological farming. The basic payment and the greening payments 
are mandatory for the EU member states. Pillar 2 is more flexible for the 
member states and can be used for rural development and environ-
mental improvements beyond a base line required by the regulations. In 
Sweden, these payments are used to subsidize land for wetland con-
struction, biodiversity improvement, water management, soil manage-
ment, bioenergy, and livestock management to reduce CO2eq emissions 
(European Commission, 2019). 
With respect to the chosen refunding of environmental improve-
ments, it can be argued that the best alternative for society would be to 
use the revenues to decrease taxes on other tax bases, such as labour or 
capital, depending on their marginal costs of taxation (e.g. Goulder, 
1995; Freire-Gonzáles, 2018). The partial equilibrium model used in this 
study does not allow for the evaluation of such refunding. Instead, we 
calculate impacts on farmers’ net income and discuss environmental 
effects of an area-based and lump-sum refunding. An area-based 
refunding comes relatively close to the output-based system used in 
the literature where output is a measurement of the size of a firm (e.g. 
Fischer, 2011; Hagem et al., 2020). In this case, each farmer receives 
funding as a proportion of the agricultural area, which is similar to the 
current basic payment from CAP. The lump-sum refunding option is 
often suggested in the literature since, in theory, it does not create any 
social costs in terms of dead weight losses from the subsidy (e.g. 
Goulder, 1995). In the present study, such a refunding scheme gives all 
farmers equal payments. 
In sum, the present study includes seven different policy scenarios 
(Table 1), the outcomes of which are compared with the reference sce-
nario where the CAP polices under Pillar 1 and 2 are in place. 
For each of these scenarios, we calculate emissions of CO2eq, and 
income for farmers in the different NUTS2 regions. The distributional 
effects on farmers’ incomes are calculated by the Suits index (Suits, 
1977), which is used in the literature to examine progressivity or 
regressivity in environmental tax/subsidy programs (e.g. Eliasson et al., 
2018; Tirkaso and Gren, 2020). The index relates the accumulated 
proportion of the costs of the tax payments (or subsidy receipts) to the 
accumulated proportion of income in different groups (see e.g. Anderson 
et al., 2003 for a description on how to calculate the index). As such, it 
shows if poor groups pay proportionally much of the total tax bill (or 
receives proportionally much of total subsidy payments). 
Table 1 
Benchmark and policy scenarios.  
Scenario Description 
Benchmark No climate tax and refunding, CAP policies are in place 
Tax Climate tax without refunding 
Refunding 
schemes:  
Peatland Refunding for carbon sequestration by restoration of drained 
peatlands 
Wetland Refunding for nutrient cleaning by wetland construction 
Grassland Refunding for biodiversity provision by grassland preservation 
All ecosystems Simultaneous refunding of all three land uses 
Lump-sum Refunding with equal payment per farmer 
Area-based Refunding with equal payments per ha farm land  
1 The NUTS classification (nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a 
hierarchical system for dividing up the economic territory of the European 
Union. The classification was established by regulation EC 1059/2003. 
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3. The partial equilibrium model and the benchmark 
The simultaneous introduction of the climate tax and the policy 
scenarios examined in this paper generates responses by the consumers 
to the climate tax on food goods, which will change relative prices of 
these goods, create adjustments by the farmers to these changes and to 
the payments in the different policy scenarios. The numerical solution of 
the final effects of these adjustments requires a partial equilibrium 
model of demand, supply and trade in food goods for Sweden. To this 
end, we use the only available open access model, the CAPRI (Common 
Agricultural Policy Regional Impact) model, which was constructed in 
1990′s to analyse effects of different agricultural policies at the EU level. 
The model evaluates effects of a policy by comparing outcomes in a 
reference or benchmark scenario with a policy scenario, such as intro-
duction of a climate tax, and is thus well suited for the purpose of this 
study. 
The CAPRI model includes two main modules; a global market model 
and a supply model. Demand for the different food goods in each country 
is based on econometric estimates of a demand system with assumption 
of utility maximizing households, which has a long tradition in eco-
nomics (e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). The demand system con-
tains own and cross price elasticities for the different consumption 
goods, and the own price elasticities for Sweden are presented in Table 
S1 in the Supplementary material. Calculation of the supply of the goods 
is based on the concept of a representative farmer operating in each 
region who is assumed to maximise farm income2 minus a nonlinear cost 
term that allows the model to be calibrated/estimated based on 
observed behaviour (Jansson and Heckelei, 2011). The regional farmer 
acts on competitive markets with given prices and subsidies subject to 
restrictions on land, existing policy variables, and feed and fertiliser 
constraints in each region. 
With respect to market equilibrium, the global market model is 
divided into 40 trade blocs where the equilibrium prices are determined. 
The demand from consumers in Sweden and supply from Swedish 
farmers enter the “EU-west” bloc together with the other 14 countries 
that had become EU-members by 1995. The other trade bloc in the EU 
“EU-east” includes the other EU countries. In addition to the CAP pol-
icies, each country in the trade bloc entails a detailed representation of 
trade policies and instruments such as tariffs, export subsidies, and 
bilateral trade agreements with countries outside EU. All goods pro-
duced within the same trade bloc are considered perfect substitutes, i.e. 
there is one market pool per bloc. For a further description of the CAPRI 
model we refer to Britz and Witzke (2014). 
In order to calculate the benchmark scenario and impacts of the 
different policy scenarios displayed in Table 1 for Sweden three ad-
justments are necessary in the CAPRI model. One is the consideration of 
difference in demand between a good produced in Sweden and im-
ported. In the CAPRI model there is no difference, which implies that the 
national origin of the consumption is not modelled. For example, all 
Swedish beef production is sold to the EU-west pool, and all Swedish 
beef consumption is sourced from that pool, regardless of where it was 
originally produced. If beef consumption in Sweden is taxed and 
reduced, demand in the EU-west pool is reduced, which implies lower 
prices for all suppliers to that pool. This price effect is likely to be small 
since the share of the Swedish demand of total demand for food com-
modities at the EU-west pool is relatively low. 
In reality, however, Swedish beef has a much higher market share in 
Sweden than in other EU countries because Swedish consumers, similar 
to consumers in other countries, tend to prefer local products to imports. 
A climate tax on consumption might then, ceteris paribus, have a greater 
impact on Swedish producers than on producers in other countries. In 
order to approximate this effect, we introduced imperfect substitution in 
consumption between domestic production and imported goods. There 
is a large body of literature estimating this so-called Armington elas-
ticity, which is infinite when consumers make no difference between 
domestic and foreign good and positive otherwise. Results from a meta- 
analysis by Bajzik et al. (2019) indicate that the mean value is approx-
imately 1 or 3 depending on adjustments for uncertainty in the esti-
mates. In the present study we use the value of 2, which is also close to 
the assumption used in the Swedish general equilibrium model devel-
oped by Swedish National Institute of Economic Research (2019). 
Similarly, on the production side, the aggregate production is composed 
of products destined for the home market and for export to the pool 
market. The constant elasticity of transformation between production 
for domestic consumption and exports is assumed to be the same as the 
Armington elasticity. For more details on the correction of trade be-
tween Sweden and the EU-west pool, we refer to Supplementary 
material. 
The second adjustment of the CAPRI model is the introduction of a 
budget constraint under the refunding policies where the total payments 
can not exceed the tax revenues. The third adjustment limits the areas of 
land eligible for payments. Restored peatland can only be undertaken on 
drained agricultural land (Pahkakangas et al., 2016). Wetlands need to 
be constructed downstream in order to provide nutrient regulation. 
There are no data on the availability of such land for the NUTS2 regions, 
and we therefore assumed that the estimate by Gren and Tirkaso (2020) 
of 1% of arable land for entire Sweden is suitable for wetland con-
struction in each region. It was assumed that the registered grassland 
area in 2016 (Statistics Sweden, 2017) constituted the maximum pay-
ment area for biodiversity (see Table S2 in Supplementary material for 
maximum available areas in the different regions). 
Given all assumptions of the CAPRI model and the Swedish compo-
nent, the reference scenario with respect to consumption, supply and 
equilibrium prices is derived under the assumption that current agri-
cultural policies (CAP 2014–2020) are fully implemented as decided, 
and then maintained up to 2030. Trends in yields, demand and land use 
are based on the EU Agricultural Outlook 2017–2030 (European Com-
mission, 2017). Calculated total emissions of CO2eq from food con-
sumption in the reference scenario amounts to 10.30 million tonnes 
(Table S5 in Supplementary material). This corresponds to approxi-
mately 20% of total territorial CO2eq emissions in Sweden in 2018 
(SEPA, 2020). Consumption of beef accounts for almost one half of total 
emissions from food. The calculated emissions from food imports 
correspond to approximately 40% of all emissions (Tables S1 and S5 in 
Supplementary material). This relatively high share of emissions from 
imports highlights possibilities for net gains for farmers under tax 
refunding schemes. 
Swedish farmers’ net incomes and land use in the reference scenario 
differ considerably between the NUTS2 regions (Table 2). 
Total net income amounts to approximately 1.4 billion euros. The 
highest average profits are obtained by farmers in the south of Sweden 
(Sydsverige, Småland med öarna) and the lowest in the north (Norra 
Mellansverige, Mellersta Norrland, Övre Norrland). It can also be noted 
that the average farm size is relatively small in the northern regions, and 
relatively large in Stockholm and Sydsverige. 
4. Impacts of the climate tax and refunding schemes 
The introduction of the climate tax will decrease the demand for beef 
and other food items with relatively large price increases but also in-
crease demand for commodities that are substitutes to these food 
products. Common to most commodities is that, in equilibrium, the main 
part of the tax is transferred to the consumers because of the low price 
elasticities in absolute terms. For example, 85% of the climate tax on 
beef, which amounts to 1950 euros/tonnes, is transferred to the con-
sumers in terms of an increase in the consumer price of beef by 18% 
(Table S4 in Supplementary material). 
The net decrease in total emissions of CO2eq is relatively small, 0.45 
2 Income is defined as the gross value added (GVA) at producer prices plus 
premiums. 
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million tonnes of CO2eq or 4.4% of the benchmark emission from food 
consumption (Table S5 in Supplementary material). This effect is lower 
than the results obtained by Säll and Gren (2015), who found that a tax 
on consumption of meat and dairy products corresponding to the 
Swedish carbon dioxide tax reduces CO2eq emissions from consumption 
of meat and diary products by 9%. This difference in results can be 
explained by the higher emission coefficients and associated climate 
taxes used by Säll and Gren (2015). Similar to Säll and Gren (2015), 
most of the total emission reduction, 80%, is due to the decrease in beef 
consumption (Fig. 1). 
It can also be noted that the emissions from consumption of pork and 
poultry increase because of the change in relative prices between those 
meat products and beef. 
4.1. Farmers’ incomes and environmental effects 
With respect to impacts of the tax on farmers’ net incomes, the 
greatest decrease in production comes from beef, sheep and goat meat 
(Table S4 in Supplementary material) and farmers producing these 
products will face reductions in net incomes in all seven policy sce-
narios. This implies that farmers producing cereals used for animal feed 
will face a decrease in demand because of the reduction in the number of 
animals and decrease in the producer price. Compared with consumer 
prices, a lower share of the tax is transferred to the producers. For 
example, the producer price of beef is reduced by approximately 7% or 
282 euros/tonnes beef (Table S4 in Supplementary material), which 
corresponds to 15% of the climate tax of 1950 euros/tonnes beef. The 
decreases in net incomes are partly compensated for by the increase in 
demand for pork and poultry. Without any refunding, total net income is 
reduced by 64 million euros, which corresponds to 4.6% of the bench-
mark net income (Table 3). 
The losses under the six policy scenarios with refunding are lower. 
Total tax revenues amount to 1.14 billion euros in all scenarios, and the 
total decrease in net income without refunding can thus be compensated 
with refunding. However, it is quite likely that the refunding creates 
transaction costs from distribution of the payments, and it is therefore 
assumed that 80% of the tax revenues, i.e. 0.91 billion euros, can be 
distributed. The refunding is also limited by the payments per ha of land 
for the different environmental improvements and by the available 
areas. The maximum environmental payment occurs for simultaneous 
payments for all three land uses and amounts to 0.73 billion euros, but 
the payments are unevenly distributed among the farmers in the 
different regions (Table S6 in Supplementary material), The lump-sum 
payment amounts to 14,441 euro/farm, which gives a higher increase 
in the reference income in average for Sweden than for payments of 
environmental improvements. Under the area-based system the pay-
ment per ha is endogenous since it creates incentives to increase the 
agricultural area and amounts to 282 euro/ha. 
Payments for peatlands, simultaneous payments for all three envi-
ronmental improvements, lump-sum and area-based payments more 
Table 2 
Number of registered farms, area of pasture and arable land, agricultural land per farm, and net incomes from agricultural production in different Swedish NUTS2 
regions in the benchmark scenario.  
Region No. of holdersa 
Agr. land 1000 ha: 
Land, ha/farm Net income, mill euros 
pastureb arararablec 
Stockholm 1939 24 97 62 30.05 
Östra mellansverig 12,027 67 635 58 251.64 
Sydsverige 9512 32 581 64 292.76 
Norra mellansverige 7120 48 168 30 109.20 
Mellersta Norrland 3400 57 62 35 54.54 
Övre Norrland 3568 33 67 28 73.00 
Småland med öarna 9955 97 278 38 316.76 
Västsverige 15,356 65 627 45 272.25 
Sweden total 62,877 423 2515 47 1400.19  
a Swedish Board of Agriculture (2016). 
b Extensive and intensive grazing from the reference scenario in CAPRI. 
c From CAPRI reference scenario. 
Fig. 1. Change in emissions of CO2eq of the climate tax without refunding for different food groups. Source: Table S5 in Supplementary material.  
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than compensate for the losses in incomes from the introduction of the 
climate tax, but to different degrees among the regions (Table 3). 
Without any refunding, the overall reduction in income corresponds 
to 4.6% of the total benchmark income. It is unevenly distributed among 
the regions, with the largest percentage decreases in Västsverige and 
Småland med öarna. Decreases in total benchmark income and for all 
regions also occur with refunding for wetlands and grassland since those 
payments are limited by small eligible areas (Table S2 in Supplementary 
material). The largest average income increase versus the benchmark, 
approximately 60%, is obtained with lump-sum payments, the total of 
which is higher than for payments of all ecosystems. The variation in 
income effects is large between regions, in particular with payments for 
all ecosystem services. The largest increase in per cent of benchmark 
income is obtained by farmers in the Stockholm region under all 
refunding schemes generating net benefits because of the relatively low 
benchmark income and abundance of drained peatland. 
With respect to environmental effects, the decrease in emissions from 
consumption of food by 4.4% is obtained under all policy scenarios. The 
refunding for restoring drained peatlands implies a carbon sink 
enhancement, which amounts to 5.9 million tonnes of CO2eq. This 
corresponds to 60% of the calculated emissions from the included food 
products and to 11.4% of total CO2eq emissions in Sweden in 2018 
(SEPA, 2020). The nitrogen and phosphorus reductions obtained by 
conversion of arable land into wetlands amount to 5.9 ktonne N and 0.07 
ktonne P, which correspond to 4.5% and 1.9% of N and P emissions from 
Sweden into the Baltic Sea respectively (Gren et al., 2018). When we 
compare the country targets for reduction requirements set by Helcom 
(2013), wetland construction accounts for 64% and 13% of the reduc-
tion requirement of N and P respectively for Sweden (Gren et al., 2018). 
The refunding based on grassland results in a slight increase in the area 
of grassland, 0.5%. There are no environmental impacts under the lump- 
sum refunding, as expected from the literature (e.g. Fischer, 2011), but 
the area of used farmland increases under the area-based system by 10% 
which implies increased leaching of nitrogen by 2%. 
4.2. Distributional effects 
The regionally differentiated impacts on the reference income of the 
consumption tax and refunding schemes raise the question whether the 
losses without refunding and payments are progressive or regressive. 
Progressivity in the losses implies that relatively rich regions face pro-
portionally much of the losses, and a progressive payment system im-
plies that poor regions receive a proportionally large share of the total 
increase in income. The Suits index measures the proportionality be-
tween income and the net costs or benefits of the tax-refund system. For 
example, when the proportion of net costs or benefits among farmer in 
the different regions is the same as the proportions of total income in the 
benchmark case, the effect is neutral and the index is zero. On the other 
hand, when relatively poor farmers face proportionally low (high) net 
costs, the index is positive (negative). 
The calculated Suits index of the climate tax without any refunding 
amounts to 0.15, which indicates that the costs of the tax is progressive. 
However, the Suits index for the payments schemes shows that they are 
all regressive, but to different degrees. The lump-sum payment is almost 
neutral with a Suits index of − 0.02, but all environmental payment 
schemes show a higher regressivity with a Suits index ranging between 
− 0.10 for grassland and − 0.31 for wetland construction (Fig. S1 in the 
Supplementary material). The reason for these regressive effects of 
refunding for environmental improvements is the location of the areas 
eligible for environmental payments, which are mainly located in re-
gions in mid and south Sweden with relatively high average incomes in 
the benchmark. This regressive effect of the payments schemes coun-
teracts the progressivity of the costs of the tax. The combined effect of 
the tax and refunding is regressive and the Suits index amounts to –0.26, 
− 0.01, and –0.16 for all ecosystems, lump-sum and area-based refund-
ing schemes, respectively. 
5. Discussion 
The results presented in this study rest on a number of different as-
sumptions related to the construction of the partial agricultural sector 
model in the CAPRI framework, availability of data and parameter 
values on included variables. The static approach of the CAPRI model 
excludes the possibilities of investment in new production and envi-
ronmental technologies with effects on future net incomes and envi-
ronmental improvements. However, the modelling of farmers’ 
investment decisions under uncertainty on e.g. yield, output and input 
prices would require quite other modelling approaches such as dynamic 
and/or stochastic programming at the farm level (e.g. Huber et al., 2017; 
Spiegel et al., 2020). Another limitation was the focus on income effects 
on farmers, and exclusion of welfare impacts on the consumers. The 
consideration of consumers would require data on impacts on different 
household categories, which is not available in CAPRI. Based on such 
data for Sweden, Säll (2018) calculated the compensation needed for 
different households to stay at the same welfare level as without an 
environmental tax on consumption of meat and diary products, where 
the tax on beef corresponded to approximately 30% of the price. The 
results indicated compensation requirements ranging between 0.51% 
and 0.99% of the household income, being highest for low-income 
households. This might be regarded as upper limit effects on the 
households from the climate tax introduced in the present study, which 
corresponds to a maximum price increase of 18%. 
Similar to most numerical partial equilibrium models, the CAPRI 
model assumes competitive markets. This is likely not to hold in practice 
for several markets, with high concentrations of a few firms on the 
supply and retail level in Sweden (e.g. Konkurrensverket, 2005). It is 
well-known in environmental economics that the optimal environ-
mental tax is in general lower than the marginal social cost of pollution 
when implemented on distorted markets since the production and, 
hence, pollution is lower than in competitive markets (e.g. Requate, 
2005). The introduction of the CO2eq tax suggested in this study would 
thus be too high on food markets with imperfect competition, and a 
Table 3 
Change in % to benchmark net income from the climate tax on food consumption with refunding for environmental improvements, lump-sum and area-based.  
Region No refunding 
Refunding for: 
Peatland Wetland Grassland All three ecosystems Lump sum Area based 
Stockholm − 2.52 113.18 3.38 2.68 118.09 90.67 103.30 
Östra mellansverige − 3.72 86.47 0.66 1.04 85.53 65.30 82.42 
Sydsverige − 2.22 25.38 3.90 − 0.28 25.36 44.70 62.40 
Norra mellansverige − 4.30 17.95 − 3.58 0.22 11.29 89.86 52.14 
Mellersta Norrland − 4.87 8.51 − 4.29 2.76 2.63 85.16 34.87 
Övre Norrland − 4.79 27.79 − 4.48 − 2.07 18.25 65.80 27.72 
Småland med Öarna − 6.52 35.85 − 5.02 − 1.65 25.98 38.86 30.05 
Västsverige − 5.99 32.17 − 0.18 − 2.22 26.77 75.46 72.52 
Sweden total − 4.60 40.82 − 0.85 − 0.60 36.22 60.25 57.84 
Sources: Calculations based on reference income in Table 2 and incomes after tax and payments in Table S7 in Supplementary material. 
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lower tax would result in smaller effects on CO2eq emissions. 
The assumption of constant emission coefficients for each con-
sumption good is likely not to hold since the coefficients change as 
production and inputs change, which would affect the total emission. 
Farmers could also change the emission intensity by e.g. changed 
feeding for livestock. The exclusion of these options is likely to over-
estimate the calculated costs of the climate tax. On the other hand, costs 
of ecosystem services include only the opportunity cost of land and not 
the cost of any investment and management of the restoration of drained 
peatland, which is likely to overestimate the incomes from all systems 
with payments for ecosystem services. 
With respect to chosen parameter values of included crucial vari-
ables, the results can be sensitive to the assumed payments for ecosystem 
services and substitution elasticities between demand and production 
for domestic and foreign goods. Therefore, sensitivity analyses were 
made for changes in the basic parameter values in the environmental 
payments and the consumption and production functions. Regarding 
environmental payments, the calculated size of the environmental 
payments rests on simplifying assumptions, in particular for biodiversity 
provision by grassland. Lower payments can be explained by a combi-
nation of lower unit values and production per ha of the ecosystem 
service. For example, the reduction in emissions of CO2eq from restoring 
drained peatlands can be lower than the estimates used in this study and 
the unit value can be below the Swedish CO2 tax. A reduction in pay-
ments by one half increases the losses with separate payments for 
grassland and wetland with more than 100% and reduces the net benefit 
from payments to peatland and all ecosystem services by approximately 
one half (Table S8 in Supplementary material). However, despite these 
effects on income, the payments are still sufficient to provide several 
targeted ecosystem services. Restoration of peatlands then remains at 
same level, but the provision of grassland shows a slight decrease. 
Because of the limitation of areas eligible for environmental payments, 
an increase in payment to the budget constraint has no environmental 
effect, but turns the net losses with payments for wetlands and grassland 
into net incomes, and increases the income with payments to peatland 
and all three ecosystems with a maximum of 60%. 
Lower substitution elasticities in the consumption and production 
functions imply a higher degree of differentiation between domestic and 
foreign product for the consumer, and for domestic and foreign sales for 
the producer. This, in turn, implies larger effects on farmers’ income of 
the climate tax on food consumption in Sweden. In order to quantify the 
role of substitution elasticity, sensitivity analyses are made where the 
substitution elasticities deviate by 0.5 from the assumed level of 2. The 
sensitivity analysis shows a modest effect of a decrease by 0.5 in both 
elasticities, where the average loss is increased by 11% (Table S9 in 
Supplementary material). Similarly, higher substitution elasticities 
imply that more of the climate tax is transferred to the EU market, which 
gives lower income losses for the Swedish farmers. The loss decreases by 
10% when the elasticities increase from 2 to 2.5. 
It is difficult to compare our results with other studies because of lack 
of studies on a food tax-refunding system. On the other hand, there is a 
large body of literature on impacts of different environmental taxes and 
subsidies to agriculture (see OECD, 2020 for a review). There are very 
few studies calculating impacts on farmers’ income from consumption 
taxes on food (Jansson and Säll, 2018; OECD, 2019). Both these studies 
calculated impacts on farmers’ incomes from introduction of CO2eq 
taxes on animal food consumption, but at different geographical scales. 
Jansson and Säll (2018) used the CAPRI model to introduce different 
levels of taxes (60 to 290 euros/tonne CO2eq) on animal food con-
sumption in the EU, and found that emissions reduced by a maximum of 
4.9% and the incomes could decrease by up to 11%. OECD (2019) used a 
global general equilibrium model and calculated effects on the OECD 
countries of a tax amounting to 100 USD /tonne CO2eq. The results 
showed that the emission reduced by approximately 3% and value 
added in the agricultural sector decreased by 8%. The calculated 
average decrease in emissions by 4.4% and in incomes by 4.6% in the 
present study is thus in the same order of magnitude as in these studies. 
There is a large body of literature on the effects of different envi-
ronmental payments to farmers (see review in Uthes and Matsdorf, 
2013). An aspect pointed out in this literature is the role of transaction 
costs. Ollikainen et al. (2008) showed that the transaction costs in 
Finland for agri-environmental policies can vary between 2% and 40% 
of the payment to the farmer depending on environmental policy. Basic 
income support combined with environmental cross compliance condi-
tions gives the lowest transaction costs while the environmental pay-
ments in general are associated with high transaction costs. The 
assumption made in the present study of 25% administration cost could 
then be too low for the environmental payments. On the other hand, the 
result showed that the maximum environmental payments amount to 
0.73 billion euros and the tax revenues to 1.1 billion euros. The trans-
action costs could thus be higher than the assumed 25% of the envi-
ronmental payment and still generate the same environmental effects. 
6. Policy implications 
Despite the limitations of the numerical model underlying the com-
parison of outcomes under the different policy scenarios, the study 
points out three main policy implications; design of a food consumption 
tax, CO2eq tax on imported food, and design of payments for ecosystem 
services. 
Several studies calculating effects of climate taxes on food goods 
have attributed emission coefficients to the goods in a life cycle analysis 
(LCA) perspective (e.g. Edjabou and Smed, 2013; Säll and Gren, 2015; 
Chalmers et al., 2016; Janson and Säll, 2018). The LCA calculates 
emission coefficient per unit food item from the ‘cradle to the grave’, 
which includes emissions at all production and processing steps of the 
good, such as use of fertilizers and transports. However, this implies 
double taxation of emissions that are subject to carbon pricing, such as 
the fertilizer industry in the EU emission trading system and national 
carbon taxes on transport emissions. The inclusion of emissions at all 
steps in the value added chain then generates too high taxes on goods, 
the magnitude of which depends on the share of emissions from taxed 
fossil fuels. Gren et al. (2019) showed that an LCA tax on beef produced 
in Sweden is 16% higher than when only non-priced carbon emission is 
included. However, it can be eight times higher for tomatoes because of 
a large share of emissions from taxed emissions on transports. An 
advantage of the tax suggested in this study compared with the LCA 
taxes is that it includes only non-taxed emissions of CO2eq. 
Current world trade agreements and EU treaties could be an 
impediment to the introduction of a national CO2eq tax on food con-
sumption, which would be particularly relevant for meat because of the 
high emission coefficients. However, as argued by Bärh (2015) and 
Arvidsson (2016), an EU country has the discretion to introduce national 
environmental taxes and associated adjustment of import prices. Ideally, 
the tax should reflect the non-taxed emissions in the countries of origin. 
The tax could then differ considerably between countries depending on 
food production technology and national environmental taxes. For 
example, the tax on Swedish consumption of tomatoes from the 
Netherlands could be twice as high as a tax on tomatoes produced in 
Sweden (Gren et al., 2019). The assumption made in this study of 
harmonized environmental taxes on each food item irrespective of 
country of origin thus implies non-optimal taxes but could be an 
advantage by its simplification of trade. 
The point of departure in this study was an output-based system for 
payment of the included ecosystem services. This implies that payments 
are made for the value of the provision of the services, and farmers then 
make net profits when the provision costs are lower than the payment. In 
Sweden, a cost-based system is often used where payments for e.g. land 
managed for biodiversity protection are based on the management cost 
of the land and not the provision of biodiversity (Swedish Board of 
Agriculture, 2018). The net benefits, in particular of restoration of 
peatlands, would be lower with such a cost-based system. The sensitivity 
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analysis made in this paper showed that even if payments for restoring 
drained peatlands were reduced by one-half, it is still profitable for the 
farmers to restore the same area and, hence, provide a considerable 
quantity of carbon sequestration. This can be a result of relatively low 
cost estimates of land conversion used in this study. It also points out the 
need for a careful design of payments in an output-based system. 
7. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this study was to assess the impacts on farmers’ 
net incomes and on the environment of a climate tax on consumption of 
food in Sweden where tax revenues were refunded for three types of 
environmental improvements (carbon sequestration by restoring 
drained peatlands, biodiversity from grassland, and nutrient cleaning by 
wetlands), lump-sum and area-based. The climate tax was determined 
by the Swedish CO2 tax and payments for the different ecosystem ser-
vices were derived from revealed preferences based on actual decisions 
on the Swedish carbon tax, nutrient targets, and the biodiversity targets. 
Similar to several other studies on a climate tax on food consump-
tion, a main conclusion in this study is that, despite a relatively high tax 
on CO2eq, the emission reduction from reduced consumption is modest 
and corresponds to approximately 4.4% of the CO2eq emissions from 
consumption without the tax. It was also shown that the main part of the 
tax is transferred to the consumer in terms of increases in prices for most 
goods. Because of the relatively large tax revenues and large payments 
for, in particular, restoration of drained peatland, the average net in-
come for farmers in all regions is higher with the tax-refund system than 
without any tax at all. This is also the case for lump-sum and area-based 
refunding. With respect to environmental effects, emissions of CO2eq 
from food consumption decrease by 4.4% in all policy scenarios. 
Furthermore, the restored peatland increases carbon sequestration cor-
responding to approximately 57% of the CO2eq emissions from food 
consumption in Sweden. 
The materialization of the environmental improvements and income 
increases from the combined system requires implementation of a pay-
ment scheme for carbon sequestration by drained peatlands that is not 
yet in place in Sweden. The construction of an efficient payment scheme 
must meet the challenges associated with difficulties to measure and 
monitor carbon sequestration, which has been made in different ways in 
other countries (see review in Gren and Aklilu, 2016). There might also 
be institutional and legal restrictions on the output-based systems for 
payments of ecosystem services applied in this study, where restrictions 
and regulations in Sweden may not allow for payments above provision 
costs. 
It was shown that the payment for the ecosystem services is in gen-
eral regressive where regions with relatively high average incomes 
receive a large proportion of the total income increase. This counter-
acted the progressivity of the losses in incomes of agricultural produc-
tion from the consumption tax where high-income regions faced a large 
share of the total losses, which may create political opposition against 
the introduction of the system. Although refunding for the purpose of 
environmental improvements may increase the acceptance of a climate 
tax on food consumption it may well be politically difficult to introduce 
a refunding system where farmers in relatively rich regions make large 
net gains. 
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växthusgaser. At http://www.naturvardsverket.se/Sa-mar-miljon/Statistik-A-O/ 
Vaxthusgaser-territoriella-utslapp-och-upptag/ (accessed October 16, 2020). 
Spiegel, A., Britz, W., Djanibekov, U., Finger, R., 2020. Stochastic-dynamic modelling of 
farm-level investments under uncertainty. Environ. Modell. Software 127, 104656. 
Statistics Sweden, 2017. Agricultural statistics 2017 including food statistics – tables. At 
https://www.scb.se/contentassets/1e184d1a18c843e2af202c44a5bda45d/jo1901_ 
2016a01_br_jo02br1701.pdf (accessed April 10, 2019). 
Sterner, T., Höglind-Isaksson, L., 2006. Refunded emission payments theory, distribution 
of costs, and Swedish experience of NOx abatement. Ecol. Econ. 57, 93–106. 
Suits, D.B., 1977. Measurement of tax progressivity. Am. Econ. Rev. 67, 747–752. 
Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2014. Utsläpp av växthusgaser från torvmark. Report 
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